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Herbert Hovenkamp as Antitrust Oracle: Appreciating 
the Overlooked Contributions of the New Harvard School 
 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO* 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Abstract 
My colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is almost universally recognized as the most cited and the 
most authoritative US antitrust scholar. Among his many honors, his status as the senior author 
of the authoritative Areeda and Hovenkamp treatise makes him the unquestioned leader of the 
New Harvard School, which has long served as the bellwether for how courts are likely to 
resolve emerging issues in modern antitrust doctrine. Unfortunately, its defining tenets and its 
positions on emerging issues remain surprisingly obscure. My contribution to this festschrift 
explores the core commitments that distinguish the New Harvard School from other approaches 
to antitrust. It then explores Hovenkamp’s scholarship on key issues, including tying, the neo-
Brandeisian/hipster antitrust movement, and digital platforms. A better understanding of 
Hovenkamp’s work and the New Harvard School should prove invaluable to anyone wishing to 
understand antitrust’s likely future. 
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I. Introduction 
Finding enough superlatives to describe my colleague, Herbert Hovenkamp, is a nearly impossible 
task. Recognized as “the dean of American antitrust law” by the New York Times,1 even scholars 
critical of Hovenkamp’s conclusions recognized him as “the most influential antitrust scholar of 
our generation.”2 Studies confirm that he is cited more often in both academic commentary3 and 
judicial opinions4 than any other antitrust scholar by a wide margin. In short, as Daniel Crane 
notes, “Hovenkamp speaks with oracle‐like authority on antitrust matters.”5 
 
Academic and governmental organizations have honored Hovenkamp for his contributions to 
antitrust as well. For example, in 2007, Hovenkamp was named a Fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts & Sciences. In 2008, the US Justice Department’s Antitrust Division honored 
Hovenkamp with its John Sherman Award (awarded only 10 times over the past 23 years) for his 
lifetime contributions to the teaching and enforcement of antitrust law and the development of 
antitrust policy, during which Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General Thomas Bartlett 
observed, “Professor Hovenkamp sets the standards for antitrust scholarship today.”6 In 2015, 
 
1 James B. Stewart, Antitrust Suit Is Simple Calculus, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2011, at B1. For observations in the 
scholarly literature sounding a similar note, see Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I 
Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA L . REV. 2025, 2025 (2015); Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust History Revisited, 
133 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1677 (2020) (reviewing TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW 
GILDED AGE (2018)); John R. Woodbury, Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE, (Dec. 2012), at 1, 4. 
2 Spencer Weber Waller, Book Review, 29 WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV. 505, 505 (2006). 
3 See Brian Leiter, 10 Most-Cited Antitrust Faculty in the U.S. for the period 2013–2017, BRIAN LEITER’S LAW 
SCHOOL REPORTS (Oct. 2, 2018), https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2018/10/10-most-cited-antitrust-
faculty-in-the-us-for-the-period-2013-2017.html; Brian Leiter, Ten Most-Cited Antitrust Faculty, 2010–2014 
(inclusive), BRIAN LEITER’S LAW SCHOOL REPORTS (July 21, 2016), https://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/ 
2016/07/ten-most-cited-antitrust-faculty-2010-2014-inclusive.html. 
4 See Bill Baer, Connecting the Antitrust Dots: In Praise of Herb Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 1, 5 (2014), 
https://ilr.law.uiowa.edu/assets/Uploads/ILR-Vol-100-Baer.pdf; Thomas G. Hungar & Ryan G. Koopmans, 
Appellate Advocacy in Antitrust Cases: Lessons from the Supreme Court, ANTITRUST (Spr. 2009), at 53, 55. For 
analyses of citations of the Areeda/Hovenkamp treatise, see Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment 
of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2039, 2046, 2049 (2015); Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The Influence of 
the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise in the Lower Courts and What It Means for Institutional Reform in Antitrust, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 1919 (2015). 
5 Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2007). 
6 Press Release, US Department of Justice, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp Receives Justice Department’s 2008 John 
Sherman Award (July 28, 2008). 
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Global Competition Review honored Hovenkamp with its Academic Excellence Award, given to 
the worldwide antitrust scholar of the year.7 
 
He is the senior author of what is universally recognized as “the most influential treatise” on 
antitrust law.8 Justice Breyer famously observed that “most practitioners would prefer to have two 
paragraphs of [the Areeda–Hovenkamp] treatise on their side than three Courts of Appeals or four 
Supreme Court Justices.”9 Lower courts have been similarly lavish in their praise for the treatise, 
making it “the starting point—and in many case the final analysis—for antitrust practitioners and 
judges.”10 Scholars have aptly called it “the most accurate bellwether of Supreme Court sentiment” 
on antitrust.11 
Anyone seeking to understand the contours of current US antitrust jurisprudence and anticipate the 
future directions it is likely to take would gain a lot from a better appreciation of Hovenkamp’s 
scholarship. My contribution to this liber amicorum seeks to provide just that by briefly exploring 
his core commitments and his positions on emerging issues in antitrust law. 
II. New Harvard’s Core Commitments 
Hovenkamp associates himself with the New Harvard School of antitrust scholarship,12 of which 
he is widely recognized as “reigning dean.” 13  Understanding the significance of this self-
 
7 D. Daniel Sokol, GCR 2015 Award Winners, ANTITRUST & COMPETITION POL’Y BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), http:// 
lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2015/04/gcr-2015-award-winners.html. 
8 Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 1984). 
9 Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Phillip E. Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 890 (1996). 
10 Allensworth, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1923. 
11 Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1911, 1920 (2009) (reviewing 
HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. 
ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)). 
12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 37 (2005) [hereinafter 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE]. 
13 Daniel A. Crane, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on Antitrust Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 45 (2012). For other 
representative statements recognizing Hovenkamp’s consensus status as the current academic leader of the Harvard 
School, see. e.g., Max Huffman, Marrying Neo-Chicago with Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 113–
14 (2012); Thomas A. Lambert & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust (Over-?) Confidence, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
219, 220 (2008); Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649, 652 n. 15 (2014); 
Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick 
Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 863 n. 149 (2016); Spence Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 
2006 UTAH L. REV. 741, 756. 
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identification is best understood by the contrasts that Hovenkamp draws with three other 
movements. 
 
First, the inclusion of the word “new” reflects Hovenkamp’s recognition that “the Harvard school 
underwent a significant transformation in the late 1970s,” driven by “the unacknowledged 
conversation experience of Donald F. Turner.” 14  This led to a rejection of many of the 
commitments associated with the original Harvard school associated with scholars such as Edward 
Chamberlin, Edward Mason, Joe Bain, Derek Bok, and the early work of both Turner and Phillip 
Areeda.15 
 
Second, he carefully contrasts his views and those of the Chicago school. On the one hand, he 
regards the Chicago school as providing “a much needed corrective” to the excesses of the Warren 
Court, “restoring rigor that had been lost, and identifying a protected class—consumers—and 
some rules for assessing how they could best be protected.”16 At the same time, some parts of the 
Chicago counterrevolution “went too far,” condoning “complex forms of anticompetitive behavior 
[that] might be anticompetitive” because “courts generally were thought to lack the ability to 
develop rules for these problems without doing more harm than good.”17 
 
Third, Hovenkamp has simultaneously distanced himself from the post-Chicago movement, 
notwithstanding the fact that he is credited with coining the term.18 Although he credits it for 
recognizing “that markets are more varied and complex than the orthodox Chicago school was 
willing to admit,” he warns that post-Chicago antitrust has been “oversold” and “has wandered too 
 
14 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 37. For the seminal writings exploring the overlooked 
importance of the New Harvard School, see William H. Page, Areeda, Chicago, and Antitrust Injury: Economic 
Efficiency and Legal Process, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 909 (2006); William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of 
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1; Crane, supra note 11. 
15 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 920 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001)) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Rationalization of Antitrust]. 
16 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 2. 
17 Id. 
18 Scholars typically trace the term to Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 
(1985) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, After Chicago]. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative 
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C.L. REV. 219, 222 n. 13 (1995); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Timothy J. 
Muris, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Beyond: Time to Let Go of the 20th Century, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 147, 147 n. 
3 (2012); Barak Orbach, The Present New Antitrust Era, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1457 (2019). 
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far to the opposite extreme.” 19  Specifically, he harbors considerable doubts over the 
administrability of antitrust rules based on “highly technical” models based on “the mathematics 
of marginalism and game theory.”20 In addition, many post-Chicago models “are not testable in 
the conventional positivist sense,” a flaw that “can prove fatal” by leaving plaintiffs able to do 
nothing more than adduce evidence that a defendant’s conduct was consistent with a theory of 
anticompetitive behavior, without being able to demonstrate the net impact of that conduct on 
economic welfare.21 The result is “solutions that are beyond the competence of the court system 
to comprehend and correct.”22 
 
Particularly telling is Hovenkamp’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,23 widely recognized as the Supreme Court’s leading (if not 
its only) post-Chicago decision.24 He regards Kodak as “the most useless and harmful antitrust 
decision of the Rehnquist Court.”25 In his eyes, the “problems of fact-finding and implementation 
under a Kodak-style rule are completely unmanageable.”26 As a result, “the gap between high 
economic theory and antitrust practice is larger than it has ever been.”27 
 
The inability to provide implementable rules has led post-Chicago economics to have “only limited 
success.” 28  Although he holds out the possibility that post-Chicago may evolve into more 
administrable rules, particularly in the areas of raising rivals’ costs and unilateral effects of 
horizontal mergers, even those areas “still confront significant problems of administrability,” “may 
not be quite ready for primetime,” and “pose a significant risk of being overused if their limitations 
are not kept in mind.”29 In short, “the complexity of post-Chicago theories would force the federal 
 
19 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 2, 39. For further details, see id. at 34–35, 49.  
20 Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 366 (2009) 
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis] 
21 Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257, 271–72 
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago]; accord HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 39. 
22 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 3. 
23 Eastman . Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 541 (1992). 
24 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 9, 98. 
25 Id. at 9. 
26 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 292; accord HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, 
at 98–101 157–58, 309–10. 
27 Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 367. 
28 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 336. 
29 Id. at 274, 321, 326, 337; accord HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 34–35, 49. 
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courts to confront problems that they are not capable of solving.”30 Although the Chicago school 
may have swung too far toward nonintervention, “at the same time much of the so-called ‘post-
Chicago’ antitrust … has wandered too far to the opposite extreme, identifying problems and 
solutions that are beyond the competence of the court system to comprehend and correct.”31 
 
What then distinguishes Hovenkamp and New Harvard from these other schools of thought? Since 
the 1970s, “Chicago and Harvard positions on competition policy have converged on most, but 
not all, issues.”32 Hovenkamp acknowledges that “there is certainly much truth” to statements that 
Harvard and Chicago “are now almost indistinguishable on many issues”33 and that he “would not 
decide very many cases differently from the way the Chicago school would decide them.”34 
 
To say that the views of the two schools are close is not to say they are the same. Hovenkamp 
notes that “today the Harvard school is modestly more interventionist than the Chicago school, but 
the main differences lie in details.”35 Hovenkamp regards the differences among the schools as 
stemming from “contrary assumptions about the complexity and robustness of markets, as well as 
divergent assessments of the abilities of courts and other government agencies to correct market 
failures.”36 Understanding these key differences sheds light on their impact on key issues in 
antitrust. Where such differences exist, the courts have generally chosen New Harvard over 
Chicago.37 
 
30 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 337. 
31 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 2. 
32 Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 366; accord Herbert Hovenkamp, Whatever Did 
Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 598 (2018) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, What Did 
Happen] (noting how Harvard and Chicago “began to converge in the late 1960s and 1970s”). 
33 Hovenkamp, Rationalization of Antitrust, supra note 15, at 927; accord Herbert Hovenkamp, Harvard, Chicago, 
and Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust Analysis, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 613, 617–18 (2010) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics] (observing that “today the[] differences [between Harvard and 
Chicago] on many issues are not all that considerable”). 
34 Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1014, 1021. 
35 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 38. 
36 Id. at 31–32, 38; Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 2474–
75 (2013) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Welfare Goals]. For similar statements, see Crane, supra note 11, at 1919–20; 
Crane, supra note 13, at 45–46, 48; Page, supra note 14, at 923. 
37 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 37–38 (observing that the “New Harvard position is the 
one most followed by the federal courts today” and that rather than embracing Chicago, antitrust “has adopted 
 
6 
1. The complexity of markets 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of New Harvard is its acknowledgement of the complexity 
of markets. It joined the Chicago school critique of the structuralism of the original Harvard school 
embodied in the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm, which regarded market 
concentration as the only relevant consideration and assigned no importance to different types of 
conduct.38 Areeda and Turner’s metamorphosis in this regard was a bit of a work in progress, as 
evidenced by their continued endorsement of no-fault monopolization in the first edition of the 
treatise in 1978.39 Hovenkamp rejected that position as early as 198540 and dropped it from the 
treatise in 1996, retaining the original discussion only for historical purposes. 41  By 2012, 
Hovenkamp could declare that “today, structuralist orthodoxy and the S-C-P paradigm are dead 
and not likely to rise again.”42 
 
 
middle-of-the-road positions more reflective of the current Harvard position than any other”); Hovenkamp, 
Welfare Goals, supra note 36, at 2475 (concluding that “where there are differences, the Supreme Court has almost 
uniformly followed the Harvard rather than the Chicago school approach”); Hovenkamp, Rationalization of 
Antitrust, supra note 15, at 927 (arguing that “judicial doctrine … has tracked the Harvard treatise more closely 
than it has tracked the Chicago School literature”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and 
the Dominant Firm, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 11, at 109, 102 [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Harvard and Chicago Schools] (finding that New Harvard “has captured antitrust decision making 
in the courts” instead of Chicago and that “antitrust law as produced by the courts today comes much closer to 
representing the ideas of a somewhat chastised Harvard School than of any traditional version of the Chicago 
School”). Other scholars concur. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives 
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, 59 (Autumn 2007); Thomas E. Kauper, Influence of 
Conservative Economic Analysis on the Development of the La of Antitrust, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL 
OVERSHOT THE MARK, supra note 11, at 40, 42. 
38 For Hovenkamp’s most detailed discussion of New Harvard’s rejection of structuralism, see Hovenkamp, 
Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 359–62, 366–67. For other discussions, see HOVENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 35–38; Hovenkamp, Rationalization of Antitrust, supra note 15, at 925. 
39 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 629c, at 45–47 (1978). This echoed proposals 
Turner had advanced in earlier writings. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 110–19, 266–72 (1959): Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under 
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 663–73 (1962). 
40 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 140–42 (1985). 
41 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 630a, at 43–46 (rev. ed. 1996). For single-
authored discussions by Hovenkamp, see, e.g., HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 156–57; 
Hovenkamp, Rationalization of Antitrust, supra note 15, at 935. 
42 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 75 (2012) [hereinafter 
Hovenkamp, Costs of Movement]. 
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New Harvard also broke with the original Harvard school by welcoming the use of price theory as 
a tool of economic analysis.43 Unlike the Chicago school, which seeks to generate simple, static 
models of competition applicable to all market structures and industries, New Harvard antitrust 
embraces more nuanced principles that can account for a broader range of variation among 
industries, firms, and conduct.44 William Page has offered the trenchant observation that the 
Chicago school’s approach is more conceptual, while New Harvard’s approach is more 
contextual.45 What this means is that rather than following Chicago’s preference for general 
economic models that describe economic behavior in all industries, New Harvard opts instead for 
more nuanced models that take variations in the details of particular markets into account.46 In so 
doing, New Harvard reflected the economics profession’s move away from large cross-sectional 
studies searching for generalizations applicable to all market structures.47 At the same time, New 
Harvard’s contextualism made it more sympathetic to case-by-case analysis tailored to the 
specifics of particular industries.48 
 
Areeda and Turner’s landmark article on predatory pricing provides a prime example. 49  Its 
advocacy for a test asking whether price fell below some measure of cost is, in Posner’s words, 
“pure textbook price theory unadorned by any of the concepts of industrial organization,” such as 
 
43 For an earlier overview, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Post-Chicago Antitrust Revolution: A Retrospective, 168 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2145, 2153–60 (2020) [hereinafter Yoo, Post-Chicago]. For other sources noting how both New 
Harvard and Chicago embraced price theory, see Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 831, 836 (1989); Alan J. Meese, The Market Power Model of Contract Formation: How 
Outmoded Economic Theory Still Haunts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1293 (2013). 
44 Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 
1843, 1851 (2020). 
45 Page, supra note 14, at 912. 
46 Id. at 912, 924; accord Kovacic, supra note 14, at 40–41 (quoting and citing Page, supra note 14, at 912–16). 
47 Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 44, at 1854. 
48 Page, supra note 14, at 912. 
49 Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 697, (1975).  
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strategic behavior.50 The test “assumed that the conditions and practices producing anticompetitive 
outcomes are uncommon and require clear proof based on objective criteria.”51 
 
Another prime example is the rule of reason, which Hovenkamp has correctly characterized as “a 
joint enterprise of the Chicago and Harvard schools.”52 For example, New Harvard criticized the 
jurisprudence treating all vertical restraints as illegal per se.53 In terms of what principle should 
replace it, “the Harvard school position was that anticompetitive outcomes were infrequent but 
possible, and that vertical restraints should be addressed under the rule of reason, requiring case-
by-case evaluation of power and anticompetitive effects.”54 The debate over tying followed a 
similar same pattern, with the Harvard school abandoning its previous support for per se illegality55 
in favor of advocating for the rule of reason.56 Areeda even produced a Federal Judicial Center 
training manual to educate judges on how to apply the burden-shifting approach used to implement 
the modern rule of reason57 that the Supreme Court would later cite with approval.58 
 
In so doing, New Harvard’s agreement with early Chicago school called for eliminating per se 
illegality in favor of the rule of reason59 but stopped short of endorsing the more extreme calls for 
 
50 Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 940 (1979) [hereinafter 
Posner, Chicago School]; accord Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 
89 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2476 (2001) (noting that Areeda and Turner’s article injected price theory into the analysis of 
predatory pricing); Nicola Giocoli, Games Judges Don’t Play: Predatory Pricing and Strategic Reasoning in US 
Antitrust, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 271, 279–80 (2014) (noting that Areeda & Turner’s predatory pricing test “came 
directly from price theory”). 
51 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 597. 
52 Id. at 611. 
53 Id. at 607 (calling per se illegality for vertical restraints “ill-conceived”); Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 
44, at 1851 (noting that “the Supreme Court wisely overruled the per se rules against nonprice restraints and 
RPM”). 
54 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 602. 
55 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 39, at 157–60. 
56 Phillip Areeda, The Rule of Reason—A Catechism on Competition, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 587 (1986); see also 
Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1137 nn. 50–51 (1976) 
(discussing how most consumer harms from tying are inherently offset by consumer benefits). 
57 PHILLIP AREEDA, THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES (FJC-ETS-81-1 1981), 
www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Antitrust.pdf. For further discussion Areeda’s embrace of the rule of reason, 
see Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 611; Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific 
Revolution: Accounting for Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 481–82 (2010). 
58 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n. 39 (1984). 
59 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Posner, Rule of Reason]; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements 
and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 153–68 (1984) (arguing for a rule of reason channelled by 
presumptions). 
9 
per se legality for predatory pricing,60 vertical restraints,61 and tying.62 One consideration that 
Chicagoans offered in support of these proposals was the complexity of the factual inquiries 
needed to determine the impact of a particular practice, which often required courts to define 
markets, calculate costs and project future monopoly profits, and measure elasticities to determine 
the likely distribution of those profits.63 Rather than abandon such inquiries as too complicated, 
New Harvard addressed the theoretical ambiguity of certain practices by using the rule to entertain 
proof of both potential competitive harm and potential offsetting explanations while 
accommodating the rarity of net anticompetitive effects by holding both to strict standards of 
proof.64 
 
Interestingly, the difference between the rule of reason and per se legality may be more about 
ideology than reality. As Hovenkamp has recognized, even though “the Supreme Court has nearly 
always followed the Harvard approach,” the “results do not differ all that much. Under existing 
predatory pricing law, plaintiffs rarely win cases.”65 Other commentators noted that the Areeda 
and Turner test “has made it especially difficult for plaintiffs to establish liability for predatory 
pricing—a rough, but not complete, equivalent to a no rule result.”66  One of their Harvard 
colleagues suggested that such an outcome was intentional, claiming that Areeda and Turner 
believed that predatory pricing “is so seldom found and so much effort has been spent looking for 
it … that you ought to set a test—as a managerial rule for the courts—so stiff that you would never 
 
60 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 154–55 (1978); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265, 333–37 (1981). 
61 BORK, supra note 60, at 288, 297; Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 24 (1981). 
62 BORK, supra note 60, at 380; Posner, Chicago School, supra note 50, at 935–36; Posner, Rule of Reason, supra 
note 59, at 11; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 182 (1976) 
(concluding that the prohibition of tying should be eliminated but dismissing that outcome as unattainable). 
63 Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 333–35. 
64 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 597, 601–02, 607; Hovenkamp & Scott Morton, supra note 44, 
at 1872. 
65 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 597; accord Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for 
Exclusionary Pricing: A Critical Journey, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 209, 211 (2015) (observing that “it quickly became 
clear that proving predatory pricing under [the Areeda and Turner] test is extremely difficult”). 
66 Kovacic, supra note 14, at 78. 
10 
find it anyway … You define it for judicial purposes out of existence.”67 Even Posner called the 
test “toothless.”68 
 
The rule of reason has been only slightly more permissive when applied to vertical restraints. In 
Hovenkamp’s words, “it has become something of a commonplace that rule-of-reason antitrust 
violations are almost impossible to prove, particularly in private plaintiff actions.” 69  Posner 
concurred, noting that “in practice, [the rule of reason] is little more than a euphemism for 
nonliability.” 70  Empirical analyses largely confirm these conclusions. A 1999 study of 495 
reported rule-of-reason cases from 1977 to 1999 found that plaintiffs won only 6.3% of the time.71 
A follow-up study of 222 reported rule-of-reason cases from 1999 to 2009 found that plaintiffs 
won only 0.5% of the time.72 
2. The robustness of markets 
Another distinguishing feature of New Harvard is that it has greater confidence than the original 
Harvard school in markets’ ability to self-correct. As Hovenkamp notes, the first edition of the 
Areeda antitrust treatise “departed significantly from Harvard orthodoxy” by “reflect[ing] a greatly 
diluted concern with entry barriers, dismiss[ing] most of the claims that vertical integration was 
inherently anticompetitive, and proposing greatly relaxed merger standards.”73 As a result, New 
Harvard “rejects the notion that the practices” that the original Harvard school condemned “are 
inherently suspicious,” recognizing that “most of the time they are beneficial because they reduce 
their production or transaction costs.”74 
 
 
67 The Fire of Truth: A Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago, 1932–1970, 26 J.L. & ECON. 163, 209 
(Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1983) (statement of Harvard Business School Professor Jesse Markham). 
68 POSNER, supra note 15, at 219 (calling the Areeda and Turner test “toothless”). 
69 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 8; see also Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 
32, at 597 (noting that defendants only “occasionally” lose vertical restraint cases). 
70 POSNER, supra note 15, at 14; see also Crane, supra note 11, at 1912 (calling vertical restraints subject to the rule 
of reason “de facto legal”). 
71 Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1275–93. 
72 Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 
830 (2009). 
73 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 37. 
74 Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 33, at 619. 
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At the same time, New Harvard “did not fully embrace the Chicago position either.”75 In short, 
“many markets very likely are messier than Chicago Theory assumes” due to asymmetric 
information, previous investments, and switching costs that prevent “investment … [from] 
flow[ing] toward competitive solutions as freely or a quickly as we hope.”76 In addition, New 
Harvard finds that Chicago too easily assumes the existence of efficiencies and that firms will pass 
the benefits of those efficiencies on to consumers.77 In short, New Harvard “finds markets to be 
more robust than the old Harvard position did, although not as robust as the Chicago school 
proclaimed, at least in its heyday.”78 
 
New Harvard thus settled into a “somewhere in the middle” between the original Harvard and 
Chicago schools, “although somewhat closer to the Chicago ‘benign’ position than to the inherent 
hostility position reflected by structuralism and the traditional leverage theory.”79 With the 2008 
Great Recession rattling their faith in markets,80 the Chicago school appears to have surrendered 
some ground in the face of this critique, exemplified by calls for a “New Chicago school” that 
adopts a “narrower, more cautious, and less categorical perspective” and makes a greater 
commitment to empiricism,81 although some would claim that these features were hallmarks of the 
Chicago school all along.82 
3. The likely efficacy of legal intervention 
Another key difference between Chicago and New Harvard is with respect to the likely 
effectiveness of government intervention. The Chicago school incorporates public choice 
skepticism that argues that legal interventions tend to reflect politics instead of attempts to address 
 
75 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 37. 
76 Id. at 34–35; accord Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 33, at 619 (noting that New Harvard 
“rejects many assumptions about costless and instantaneous entry, easy resource mobility, and limitlessly rational 
market participants … attributed to Chicago School antitrust analysis”); Hovenkamp, Costs of Movement, supra 
note 42. 
77 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 620. 
78 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 38. 
79 Hovenkamp, Transaction Cost Economics, supra note 33, at 623. 
80 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 
(2009). 
81 Crane, supra note 13, at 47–48. 
82 Kobayashi & Muris, supra note 18, at 155. 
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market failures.83  As a result, it has traditionally taken a fairly dim view of every antitrust 
enforcement institution.84 
 
New Harvard takes a more nuanced view of enforcement that focuses on the institutional 
competency of different types of actors.85 As William Page has noted, Areeda had longstanding 
connections with the Legal Process School, which focused on distributing decision-making 
authority to the actor best suited to the task.86 For example, taking a page out of the longstanding 
critique that antitrust courts are poorly suited to setting prices, Areeda’s well-known article on the 
essential facilities doctrine argued in favor of allocating that task to regulatory agencies instead.87 
The Supreme Court embraced that interpretation in Trinko88 and in subsequent decisions, such as 
linkLine89 and Credit Suisse.90 
 
In addition, the likely efficacy of antitrust law turns as much on the administrability of the 
particular rule being applied as on the competence of institution applying it.91 Simply put, some 
rules are too complex for courts to apply no matter how well founded in economic theory they may 
be. As Hovenkamp has noted,92 Areeda and Turner often rejected calls for more complex models 
on administrability grounds.93 
 
 
83 See. e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 
371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard 
A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
84 Crane, supra note 13, at 49–53. 
85 Crane, supra note 11, at 1919–20; Kovacic, supra note 14, at 75. 
86 Page, supra note 14, at 912–14. 
87 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1989). 
88 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
89 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
90 Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
91 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 50–56. 
92 Hovenkamp, Costs of Movement, supra note 42, at 69.  
93 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 41, ¶ 736; Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Williamson on Predatory 
Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337, 1348 (1978); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976). 
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Concerns about administrability help explain Hovenkamp’s reservations about the post-Chicago 
school, which he describes as “oversold.”94 Such ambivalence is remarkable given that his 1986 
Michigan Law Review article is credited with coining the phrase.95 
 
As Hovenkamp notes, “antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make markets more 
competitive,” and “this constraint places a premium on administrability.”96 Unfortunately, post-
Chicago economics employs “the mathematics of marginalism and game theory in a highly 
technical fashion, in many cases far beyond the ability of any court to administer in the context of 
legal regulation.”97 In addition, many post-Chicago models “are not testable in the conventional 
positivist sense,” a flaw that Hovenkamp notes “can prove fatal.”98 Plaintiffs can adduce evidence 
that a defendant’s conduct was consistent with a theory of anticompetitive behavior, but the 
inability to rule out alternative explanations provides no guidance as to that conduct’s net impact 
on economic welfare.99 
 
Exhibit A is Hovenkamp’s criticism of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Services, Inc.,100 widely recognized as the leading (if not the only) post-Chicago 
decision.101 Although Hovenkamp subjects the Court’s reasoning to some important conceptual 
criticism, he also offers negative comments relating to administrability, noting that “problems of 
fact-finding and implementation under a Kodak-style rule are completely unmanageable.”102 
Fashioning a remedy to this violation requires courts to set the price and nonprice terms under 
which Kodak must sell aftermarket parts.103 Using reasoning similar to that that the Court would 
later follow in Trinko, Hovenkamp concludes that such “public utility style regulation of 
aftermarket prices is not merely administratively impossible, it is not an ‘antitrust solution’ to the 
 
94 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 39. 
95 Hovenkamp, After Chicago, supra 18. 
96 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 269. 
97 Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 366. 
98 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 272. 
99 Id. at 272. 
100 Eastman . Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 541 (1992). 
101 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 98. 
102 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 292. 
103 Id. at 292. 
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problem at hand, which is to make markets competitive.” 104  In other words, “Kodak-style 
injunctions effectively take a ‘public utility’ rather than an ‘antitrust’ approach to the problem of 
aftermarket monopolies – that is, rather than forcing competition, they turn the putative monopolist 
into a price-regulated common carrier or public utility. The result is to prolong the very monopoly 
that the Court’s decree was intended to discipline.”105 He offers similar critiques of the use of post-
Chicago economics to analyze long-term franchise arrangements and predatory pricing.106 
 
This inability to reduce game theoretic insights into implementable rules has led post-Chicago 
economics to have “only limited success.”107 He does hold out the possibility that post-Chicago 
may evolve into more administrable rules,108 particularly in the areas of raising rivals’ costs and 
unilateral effects of horizontal mergers, but even those areas “still confront significant problems 
of administrability,”109 “may not be quite ready for primetime,”110 and “pose a significant risk of 
being overused if their limitations are not kept in mind.”111 
 
In short, “the complexity of post-Chicago theories would force the federal courts to confront 
problems that they are not capable of solving.”112  The result is that “the gap between high 
economic theory and antitrust practice is larger than it has ever been.”113 This leads Hovenkamp 
to conclude that “when a particular form of behavior is too complex for reliable analysis within a 
reasonable time, then the only defensible antirust rule is to let the market—rather than state 
intervention—control that behavior, at least for the time being.”114 
 
The inability to fashion administrable rules may force regulators to leave potential anticompetitive 
conduct unremedied. Hovenkamp notes, “at all times we must remember that if we believe that 
 
104 Id. at 293. 
105 Id. at 294. 
106 Id. at 304–17. 
107 Id. at 336. 
108 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 49; Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 274. 
109 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 321. 
110 Id. at 326. 
111 Id. at 337. 
112 Id. 
113 Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 367. 
114 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 273.  
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markets generally work well when left alone, then intervention is justified only in the relatively 
few cases where the judiciary can fix the problem more reliably, more cheaply, or more quickly 
than the market can fix itself.” 115  When intervention cannot assure that is the case, “some 
deviations [from perfect competition] must simply be tolerated,” 116  and “the rather tolerant 
Chicago school rule may be the best one for policy purposes even though substantial 
anticompetitive behavior goes undisciplined, simply because we cannot recognize and remedy it 
with sufficient confidence,”117 despite the fact that “it does not do the best job of expressing what 
we know about economic theory.”118 
 
That said, the comparative institutional framework adopted by New Harvard represents a 
substantial challenge to the Chicago school’s tendency to disparage both judicial and regulatory 
enforcement.119 Proponents have urged the emerging New Chicago school to develop a more 
constructive theory of institutions to prevent its position from devolving into a de facto call for 
nonenforcement.120 At the same time, Hovenkamp’s doubts about the administrability of game 
theoretic approaches lead him to stop short of embracing post-Chicago antitrust as well. 
III. Implications for Emerging Issues 
These conceptual foundations in general and Hovenkamp’s scholarship in particular can provide 
important guides to the New Harvard School’s position on key emerging issues in antitrust law. 
This section will briefly analyze three key issues: tying, the consumer welfare standard, and digital 
platforms. New Harvard’s historical role as the harbinger of what courts are likely to do gives this 
analysis doctrinal importance. 
 
115 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 124. 
116 Hovenkamp, Competition Policy in Crisis, supra note 20, at 367. 
117 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 48 
118 Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago, supra note 21, at 271. 
119 Crane, supra note 13, at 46, 49–53; Crane, supra note 11, at 1919–20; see also Fred. S. McChesney, Antitrust and 
Regulation: Chicago’s Contradictory Views, 10 CATO J. 775, 780–83, 792–93 (1991) (arguing that the Chicago 
critique of regulation applies with equal force to antitrust judging). 
120 Crane, supra note 13, at 58–65. 
16 
1. Tying 
Tying has long served as one of the central focal points of debates over antitrust policy. The Warren 
Court decisions that erected a per se rule that permitted liability without any showing of market 
power or market exclusion121 prompted a furious critique from Chicago school scholars, who 
challenged claims that tying would give a monopolist leverage over the tying product market122 
and would allow firms to foreclose the emergence of competition in the tied product market.123 
They argued for replacing the rule of per se illegality not with the rule of reason but rather with 
per se legality.124 
 
The New Harvard position on tying is best regarded as a qualified embrace of the Chicago 
school.125 For example, Areeda abandoned the original Harvard school’s endorsement of per se 
illegality126 and openly argued that tying should be governed by the rule of reason.127 Hovenkamp 
agreed that failing to require a showing of market power and a threat of monopolization turned the 
law of tying into a “competitive travesty.”128 In addition, Hovenkamp recognized that “Bork’s 
chapter on tying thoroughly eviscerated the Supreme Court’s per se rule against ties, particularly 
its failure to take market power requirements seriously.”129 
 
More specifically, Hovenkamp regards the leverage theory of tying to be “discredited.”130 New 
Harvard continues to accept the foreclosure theory of tying, however,131 and accepts the notion 
 
121 BORK, supra note 60, at 366–72; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Law of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 
1880–1960, 95 IOWA L. REV. 863, 905–6 (2010). 
122 Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). 
123 POSNER, supra note 62, at 176; Richard A. Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 506, 510 (1974); see also BORK, supra note 60, at 231–38 (offering a more extended critique of the 
foreclosure argument in the related context of vertical integration). 
124 BORK, supra note 60, at 380. 
125 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 604. 
126 KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 39, at 157–60. 
127 Areeda, supra note 56, at 587. 
128 Hovenkamp, supra note 121, at 905–6. 
129 Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 983, 1000 (2014). 
130 HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE, supra note 12, at 201. 
131 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 604–5; Hovenkamp, Harvard and Chicago Schools, supra note 
37, at 111. 
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that anticompetitive harms are unlikely, but possible.132 As a result, it advocates applying the rule 
of reason to tying, “making violations difficult to prove but not ruling them out altogether.”133 This 
position regards tying as presumptively legal but permits condemnation “if market power and 
anticompetitive harm are proven under clearly articulated theories.”134 
 
The courts have “chipped away” at the per se rule since the 1980s.135 For example, Jefferson Parish 
adhered to the per se rule as a matter of precedent but proceeded to recognize a market power 
requirement and conducted an analysis reminiscent of the rule of reason.136 Independent Ink 
overruled prior decisions, holding that market power may be inferred from the existence of a patent 
without a showing of market power, in the process recounting the Court’s decisions moving away 
from the per se rule.137 The Microsoft case created an exception to the per se rule for tying 
arrangements for software operating system platform ties.138 
 
Hovenkamp has called the demise of the per se rule for tying “all but inevitable.”139 At the same 
time, Hovenkamp has documented numerous scenarios in which the impact of tying on consumer 
welfare is ambiguous, including variable proportion ties, ties causing interproduct price 
discrimination, and tying and bundled discounts of imperfect complements. 140  Although the 
Chicago and New Harvard schools agree that courts should not treat tying as per se illegal, courts 
show no sign of embracing the Chicago school’s call for per se legality for tying.141 Instead, 
“notwithstanding Chicago school efforts to write ‘foreclosure’ out of the list of worthwhile 
antitrust concerns, the case law continues to recognize a concept of market foreclosure that has 
been a mainstay of Harvard school antitrust policy since Joe Bain’s writing on entry barriers in the 
1950s, although it has been considerably disciplined in subsequent years.” 142  Hovenkamp 
 
132 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 602. 
133 Hovenkamp, Welfare Goals, supra note 36, at 2475. 
134 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 604. 
135 Id. at 605. 
136 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984). 
137 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35–37, 43, 46 (2006). 
138 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89–91 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
139 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 605. 
140 Hovenkamp, Welfare Goals, supra note 36, at 2480–89. 
141 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 605; Hovenkamp, Welfare Goals, supra note 36, at 2475. 
142 Hovenkamp, Harvard and Chicago Schools, supra note 37, at 111. 
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concludes, “The economic thinking of the two schools is much closer today … than it was in the 
1960s and earlier. Where there are differences, the Supreme Court has almost uniformly followed 
the Harvard rather than the Chicago school approach.”143 
 
Tying illustrates the impact of New Harvard’s core commitments on antitrust doctrine. Instead of 
relying on a reductionist approach built around models applicable to all markets and industries in 
the manner favored by the Chicago school, the New Harvard School prefers approaches to tying 
that reflect the greater complexity and variation across markets. The institutional limitations of 
courts may prevent them from fully assessing the economic impact of particular types of ties on 
all actors. “For example, if a tying arrangement produces significant producer gains but impacts 
different consumers differently and net harm or benefit is impossible to determine, then the law 
should be reluctant to intervene.”144 
2. Neo-Brandeisian/hipster antitrust 
One of the areas where New Harvard has the most to say is with respect to what is called neo-
Brandeisian 145  or hipster antitrust. 146  movement. Its core tenets include the abandonment of 
consumer welfare as the goal of antitrust in favor of a more structuralist approach and more 
vigorous enforcement in blocking mergers and in breaking up large companies.147 
 
This movement amounts to a revival of the populist school that dominated antitrust during the 
Warren Court before being abandoned during the 1970s.148 Although the Chicago school is often 
given primary credit for the rejection of populist goals in favor of the consumer welfare standard, 
the New Harvard School also played a critical role.149 For example, the first edition of the Areeda 
 
143 Hovenkamp, Welfare Goals, supra note 36, at 2475. 
144 Id. at 1496. 
145 See, e.g., Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. 
& PRAC. 131 (2018). 
146 The term was coined by Kostya Medvedovsky in response to a tweet by Joshua Wright, who popularized the term. 
Hipster antitrust hits the Senate: The Tipline for 4 August 2017, GCR (Aug. 4, 2017), https:// 
globalcompetitionreview.com/hipster-antitrust-hits-the-senate-the-tipline-4-august-2017. 
147 See, e.g., WU, supra note 1, at 127–37; Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 
737–46 (2017).  
148 For an overview, see Yoo, Post-Chicago, supra note 43, at 2147–50. 
149 Id. at 2151–52 & nn. 29–32 (citing sources) 
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and Turner treatise (published in 1978) embraced the consumer welfare standard, concluding that 
the case law “support[s] the priority of competition and its efficiency goals” and that promoting 
non-efficiency goals would be “excessively costly, futile, or unadministrable.”150 In the process, 
the treatise rejected populism, noting that “the contribution to populist goals from rules specially 
created to promote them would be far too small to warrant the inevitable legal difficulties, 
uncertainties, and enforcement costs they would involve” and cautioning that a “large, powerful, 
and highly visible firm can also be a scapegoat for political demagoguery.”151 
 
Hovenkamp has expressed similar critique of neo-Brandeisianism, which he regards as “mak[ing] 
expansive claims … that are technically undisciplined, untestable, and even incoherent.”152 As a 
result, “often movement participants lack a serious understanding of economics and have wildly 
unrealistic expectations about what competition policy can accomplish, as well as inconsistent and 
even incoherent goals.”153 
 
He reiterated and expanded on this position in a subsequent article defending consumer welfare as 
the touchstone of antitrust. He notes that neo-Brandeisianism shares with the prior populist school 
a hostility toward large firms as a concern divorced from exclusionary conduct or anticompetitive 
effect,154 but surpasses its processor in terms of hostility toward economic efficiency and low 
prices. 155  He also invoked considerations of administrability and institutional competency 
characteristic of New Harvard when cautioning about the indeterminacy of trading off low prices 
and high output against overtly political goals and the dangers of special interest capture in the 
absence of specific rules, remedies, metrics, and rules of causation.156 Although he finds consumer 
welfare to be more amenable to judicial resolution than the type of balancing required to calculate 
 
150 1 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE 
APPLICATION 7, 24 (1978). 
151 Id. at 22, 30; accord Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (concluding the goal of antitrust law “is to promote consumer welfare” and that 
“there is no reasonable basis for presuming that courts must give priority or even weight to populist goals where 
ethe pursuit of such goals might injure consumer welfare”). 
152 Hovenkamp, What Did Happen, supra note 32, at 597. 
153 Id. at 585. 
154 Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, 45 J. CORP. L. 65, 67, 82, 92, 93 
(2019). 
155 Id. at 82, 89. 
156 Id. at 89–92. 
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total welfare,157 he makes clear that the type of balancing required by the neo-Brandeisian rejection 
of economic welfare altogether would be far more problematic.158 
 
Hovenkamp’s rejection of neo-Brandeisian antitrust follows from the fundamental principles on 
which New Harvard is built. Its acknowledgement of the complexity of markets rejects penalizing 
firms simply because of their large size and underscores the need to evaluate the economic impact 
of particular conduct in a specific context. He strikes a middle ground on the robustness of markets, 
noting on the one hand that “economies of scale, network economies, or other cost savings may 
create economic preferences for larger firms or collectives,”159 while still recognizing the potential 
existence of problems that markets cannot solve. 160  It is further informed by institutional 
considerations that render populist concerns judicially unenforceable. 
3. Digital platforms 
A better understanding of the New Harvard School may also provide insight into how enforcement 
authorities are likely to resolve what has emerged as the most important antitrust issue of our time: 
digital platforms. Digital platforms are the subject of major enforcement actions and investigations 
by the US, the UK, Australia, and the European Commission,161 as well as major reports by 
enforcement agencies,162 legislative staff,163 and scholarly commentators.164 Hovenkamp recently 
published a major article on Antitrust and Platform Monopoly that avoids the excesses of the 
 
157 Id. at 71–72, 92. 
158 Id. at 92–93. 
159 Id. at 92. 
160 Id. at 93–94. 
161 Michael Sweeney & Paulina Zawiślak, Antitrust Investigations and Lawsuits Against Google, Apple, Facebook, 
and Amazon (GAFA), CLEARCODE (Mar. 22, 2021), https://clearcode.cc/blog/antitrust-investigations-gafa/. 
162 AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY: FINAL REPORT 66–68 
(2019), www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf. For reports 
produced by experts at the request of enforcement authorities, see DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, 
UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION 35 (2019), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf; JACQUES 
CRÉMER ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY IN THE DIGITAL ERA: FINAL REPORT 20–24 (2019), https:// 
ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf. 
163 STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COMMERCIAL & ADMIN. L. OF THE H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH 
CONG., INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS (Comm. Print 2020). 
164 GLOBAL ANTITRUST INST., REPORT ON THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg eds., 
2020), https://gaidigitalreport.com/; STIGLER COMM. ON DIGITAL PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT (2019), https:// 
research.chicagobooth.edu/stigler/media/news/committee-on-digital-platforms-final-report. 
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extreme positions taken by some in this debate by advancing a characteristically thoughtful and 
nuanced position that takes the possibility of consumer harm seriously in a way that accommodates 
the economic and institutional ambiguities.165 
 
For example, Hovenkamp criticizes the tendency to presume without analysis that digital markets 
are exceptional.166 Specifically, he rejects blanket assertions that digital markets are inherently 
monopolistic, correctly noting that platforms frequently compete with non-platforms167 in markets 
that are often two-sided168 and in which products are differentiated169 and users tend to multi-
home.170 In addition, the scale economies and network effects that characterize many digital 
markets arise with respect to particular inputs and services, and not to entire companies.171 This 
makes the proper boundaries of relevant markets and whether those markets are winner-take-all 
fact-intensive questions that must be analyzed empirically and not simply be asserted. 172 
Importantly, Hovenkamp notes that to date such claims have “little empirical support.”173 Quite 
the contrary, he finds it “rarely true” that markets for digital platforms are winner-take-all174 and 
that “few platforms are natural monopolies.”175 
 
Hovenkamp also eschews claims for addressing digital platforms through regulation, preferring 
the traditional tools of antitrust. Regulation “rarely comes close to mimicking competitive 
behavior” and “necessarily generalizes and applies the same rules to several firms in an area.”176 
Equally problematic is regulation’s tendency to “entrench[] existing technologies and, in so doing, 
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bolster[] existing incumbents.”177 Antitrust is better suited to the fact-specific inquiry needed to 
protect consumers when firms are pursuing diverse technological and business strategies.178 
 
In terms of remedies, Hovenkamp attempts to strike a middle ground. On the one hand, 
Hovenkamp is skeptical about imposing radical structural remedies, such as the breakup of a firm 
in the absence of a merger.179  He notes, “Too often, well-intended divestitures or structural 
separations end up harming customers by reducing output.”180 Compelling a divestiture risks 
harming consumers by preventing firms from realizing the benefits of network effects, systems 
integration, and economies of scale.181 The same is true for line-on-business restrictions, which 
can prevent firms from achieving economies of scope and network effects, particularly in 
industries such as digital platforms that involve significant fixed and joint costs.182 “To the extent 
these breakups interfere with a firm’s production and distribution, they can produce harmful results 
such as increased costs or loss of coordination,” particularly when production is integrated, as is 
often the case with digital platforms.183 
 
Separating lines of business that do not directly compete with one another into independent 
companies also does nothing to increase competition. As he cogently notes, “If a manufacturer 
makes 80% of the world’s toasters and 75% of the world’s blenders, compelling divestiture of one 
will yield one firm that makes 80% of the world’s toasters and a second firm that makes 75% of 
the world’s blenders.”184 Moreover, “divestiture is also a blunt instrument” that requires the 
severing of all connections instead of targeting those contracts that harm competition.185 As a 
result, “divestitures often end up being either too broad or too narrow in relation to the harm they 
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Hovenkamp sees more room for divestitures of lines of business acquired by merger so long as 
both units have continued to operate separately.187 Similarly, line-of-business restrictions are less 
invasive when they prevent entry into new lines of business instead of mandating the spinoff of 
existing operations. 188  Such divestitures are more problematic when the combined firm has 
integrated operations or when most of the growth has occurred after the merger.189 
 
He sees greater promise in targeted behavioral remedies that do not require restructuring existing 
companies, focusing primarily on two alternatives. The first is to restructure the governance of a 
digital platform into a cooperative in which competing entities share ownership and management 
of the platform, with motivating examples being the Chicago Board of Trade, the NCAA, the NFL, 
real estate boards, and the association that gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in Terminal 
Railroad.190 The second is a system of mandatory interoperability or pooling, with motivating 
examples being the Insurance Services Office (ISO), Journal Storage (JSTOR), and the antitrust 
decree that mandated blanket licensing of digitized music.191 
 
Finally, Hovenkamp addresses the digital platforms’ practice of acquiring nascent competitors. 
Again, he calls for a balanced approach. On one hand, such acquisitions can create social value by 
allowing the integration of synergistic enterprises.192 On the other, eliminating a competitor can 
create social costs in much the same manner as a cartel.193 He offers two potential solutions to this 
conundrum. First, he suggests limiting any acquisition of intellectual property in such a transaction 
to a nonexclusive license, which would allow the realization of the integration value while 
minimizing the exclusion value of the merger.194 Second, he argues that mergers that lead to the 
removal of the assets of the acquired firm from the market be prohibited.195 While mergers that 
lead to joint operations can create efficiencies, “economically, a merger-plus-shutdown is no 
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different than the out-put reduction that attends a cartel.”196 This rule must take into account that 
not all mergers work out, which can lead to complete or partial shutdowns of the acquired company 
notwithstanding initial intentions to operate it.197 As a result, Hovenkamp argues against a per se 
rule prohibiting post-acquisition shutdowns so long as the acquiring firm has made a good-faith 
effort to put the acquired assets to productive use.198 
 
Hovenkamp’s position bears all of the hallmarks of the New Harvard School. Rather than 
accepting simplistic price-theoretic claims that digital platforms are not inherently monopolistic, 
he explores features that make these markets more complex and differentiated199 and recognizes 
the incentives for digital platforms to engage in strategic behavior. Nor does he take for granted 
that markets for digital platforms will be self-correcting. Finally, he takes institutional 
considerations into account, concluding somewhat contrary to Areeda and Trinko that remedies 
for this conduct are best overseen by antitrust courts instead of regulatory agencies. He also 
advances a series of provocative remedial proposals that, given his stature and the prominence of 
the publication venue of this article, are sure to garner serious consideration. His call for barring 
killer acquisitions that cannot possibility yield efficiency benefits is similar to the law’s hostility 
toward naked exclusion.200 
 
That said, many of his proposals are likely to promote controversy. For example, requiring a 
unitary company to reorganize itself into a system of shared ownership and management and 
information pooling would undoubtedly be difficult, and the resulting governance structure would 
be vulnerable to multiple types of opportunistic and strategic behavior, as Hovenkamp 
recognizes.201 Moreover, the costs of reconfiguring data and the deep link between data structures 
and functionality is likely to make mandating interoperability quite difficult.202 Hovenkamp’s 
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supposed success story, the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is widely regarded as a failure.203 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has questioned the antitrust court’s ability to implement such a 
mandate.204 
 
On the other hand, the scale advantages that Hovenkamp recognizes already provide strong 
incentives for platforms to make their operations interoperable.205 Tellingly, the motiving cases to 
which Hovenkamp points involved voluntary decisions to adopt a collective governance structure 
more reminiscent of Robert Merges’s Contracting into Liability Rules than government 
intervention.206 The key question is whether some wedge exists to cause private incentives to 
deviate from social incentives. Hovenkamp in essence infers the existence of such deviation from 
the persistence of dominance, which in the absence of natural monopoly must come from strategic 
behavior.207 The other possibility, acknowledged by Hovenkamp but given less weight,208 is that 
durable market leadership may be the result of innovation and investment. Lastly, remedies may 
have unexpected secondary consequences. Consider, for example, potential limitations on 
acquiring nascent competitors. The history of the FCC’s financial interest and syndication rules 
(finsyn) reveals how regulations limiting dominant firms’ ability to acquire interests in smaller, 
independent actors backfired, limiting their markets in ways that ultimately harmed the entities the 
regulation was intended to protect.209 
IV. Conclusion 
This volume represents a fitting honor for the preeminent antitrust scholar of his generation. I can 
think of no one more deserving of a liber amicorum. Despite Hovenkamp’s preeminence, a lack 
of understanding of the core commitments underlying his scholarship and the New Harvard School 
that he champions has obscured the precise nature of their contributions. I hope that this paper 
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helps provide a greater appreciation for what Hovenkamp has meant to antitrust law and some 
indications about the directions it will likely take in the future. 
